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Abstract—The classical approach for Internet topology mea-
surement consists in distributively collecting as much data as
possible and merging it into one single piece of topology on which
are conducted subsequent analysis. Although this approach may
seem reasonable, in most cases network measurements performed
in this way suffer from some or all of the following limitations:
they give only partial views of the networks under concern, these
views may be intrinsically biased, and they contain erroneous
data due to the measurement tools. Here we present a new tool,
named UDP PING, that relies on a very different approach for
the measurement of the Internet topology. Its basic principle is to
measure the interface of a given target directed toward a monitor
which sends the measurement probe. We demonstrate how to use
it to deploy real world-wide measurements that provide reliable
(i.e. bias and error free) knowledge of the Internet topology,
namely the degree distribution of routers in the core Internet in
our example.
I. INTRODUCTION
It appeared a decade ago that the Internet topology
has features which make it very different from classical
assumptions and models. As these properties were highly
counter-intuitive, they received much attention, and much
effort has been devoted to understand them and capture them
into relevant models. Nowadays, measuring and modeling
Internet-like topologies has become a well-recognized area
of research in itself. Indeed, it makes no doubt that features
observed in Internet measurements should be part of our
modeling effort. However, gaining accurate and reliable
knowledge of actual properties of the Internet topology is
challenging. As stated by W.Willinger (in [1], p.586), ”A
very general but largely ignored fact about Internet-related
measurements is that what we can measure in an Internet-like
environment is typically not the same as what we really
want to (or what we think we actually measure)”. Indeed,
the Internet is a huge and complex system composed of
many different (sometimes buggy) protocol implementations,
heterogeneous and poorly documented devices, operators
implementing different (and often not measurement-friendly)
policies, etc. As a consequences, data obtained from
measurements is partial, and often biased. Going further,
understanding such data and deriving appropriate conclusions
is a challenge in itself and it relies on a deep knowledge of
the actual deployment of infrastructures, both nowadays and
in the past as old devices/software/protocols are mixed with
the most modern ones. As a consequence, current knowledge
of Internet topology remains limited, as well as confidence in
previously published studies.
The classical approach for Internet topology measurement
consists in collecting as much data as possible (using for
instance traceroute of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) tables)
and in constructing from it a view of the topology by
merging the obtained data. Although this approach may seem
reasonable, in most cases network measurements give partial
views of the networks under concern, contain erroneous
data for the reasons cited above, and may moreover be
intrinsically biased. For instance, it is shown in [2], [3] (both
experimentally and formally) that the degree distribution
observed on measurements of the Internet topology may be
significantly biased by the measurement procedure. Similar
problems occur for other properties and other networks [4],
[5], [6], [7]. This has crucial consequences for the field. For
instance, the results claiming that the Internet is very resilient
to failures but sensitive to attacks [8], [9], [10], [11] rely
on the assumption that the Internet has a power-law degree
distribution with a given exponent, which is observed in
measurements [12]. The fact that such degree distributions
may be observed even if the underlying network has a totally
different degree distribution [2], [3]) makes the relevance
of these results unclear. This leads to difficult discussions
and analyses of the extent to which the observed degree
distribution may be trusted [13], [4].
This problem is nowadays widely acknowledged: as
network measurements rely on intricate procedures which
give limited views of the network, the obtained views may
have properties induced by the measurement procedure, and
thus differ significantly from the ones of the studied network.
However, only very limited and unsatisfactory solutions exist
to cope with this problem: despite a few exceptions [5], [6],
[7], most results on this topic are negative and show that the
observed properties should not be trusted [2], [3], [5]. One
approach could be to derive the properties of the network of
interest from the observed ones (rather than simply consider
that the observed ones are true), but this turns out to be
very difficult. Another approach could be to conduct larger
measurements, and this is indeed done (Caida [14], Dimes
[15]). However, the network to measure generally evolves
faster than our ability to measure it, and thus such approaches,
even though they provide interesting data, do not solve the
problem.
II. OBJECTIVE
The degree distribution of a network topology (i.e. for
each integer k the fraction pk of nodes with k links) is
one of its most basic properties. It has a strong impact on
key features of the network like efficiency of protocols and
robustness to failures and attacks. Until the seminal papers
[16], [12] in the late 90’s, it was commonly assumed that the
degree distribution of the Internet followed a homogeneous
law, generally modeled by a Poisson distribution. Based on
actual measurements, though, these papers gave evidences
of the fact that it may be much more heterogeneous, better
modeled by a power-law. Since then, much effort is devoted
to studying this distribution and capturing it in appropriate
models of the Internet.
However, as stated above, recent works have shown that
the observed degree distribution of the Internet may be
significantly biased by the measurement process. Indeed, it
is deduced from partial maps obtained through intricate and
unreliable measurements which tend to give biased views.
Our objective here is to show the implementation of a new
approach able to rigorously estimate the degree distribution of
the Internet, in a much more reliable way than before. Instead
of building maps of this topology, we design a method to
accurately estimate the degree of a given router; then we
build a process that allows to select core routers uniformly
at random, and estimate their degree. We therefore obtain an
accurate estimate of the degree of a set of random nodes in
the considered topology, representative of the whole.
It is worth noticing that the present work is related to
two complementary papers. In [17], we showed by simulations
that the approach succeeds in accurately estimating the degree
distribution of various topologies and is free from bias. In [18],
we deployed a real world-wide measurement campaign using
this tool and we presented the first results related to the degree
distribution of routers in the core Internet.
III. PRINCIPLES
Our approach relies on our ability to accurately measure
the degree of a given core router and to uniformly sample
core routers (independently from their degree). We then
measure the degree of such random routers and obtain the
degree distribution of a representative set of routers. If the set
is large enough, this degree distribution is close to the one of
the whole network.
A. Measuring the degree of a given router
When a machine in the Internet receives an invalid packet
from a sender S, it is in general supposed to answer to S
with an error message using the dedicated ICMP protocol.
Many tools, including traceroute and many alias resolution
tools, rely on this feature to generate errors which provide
information regarding the network. An important feature of
such error messages is that they are in principle sent using
the interface of the machine that routes packets towards S.
Therefore, by generating an error on a target t, a monitor m
obtains an interface of t. If many monitors distributed in the
Internet do so, then they will probably obtain all interfaces of
the target, and so its degree.
We implement here this approach with UDP PING, a
tool that we designed and implemented, which sends a UDP
packet to a target on an unallocated port. See Section IV-A
for details on the implementation and behavior of this tool.
Notice that not all routers answer to such probes, and
that some routers always use the same interface to answer.
Likewise, some routers may answer with random interfaces.
We will handle such issue below. The key point here is that,
given an appropriate set of monitors and a correct target, we
are able to accurately estimate its degree. This is already
an improvement over previous situation, where no such tool
existed and where the degree of a node could only be guessed
from maps obtained with traceroute-based measurements.
B. Sampling targets
With the ability to reliably estimate the degree of a single
router as explained above, one may estimate the degree
distribution of a set of nodes (by applying the method to
each node in the set). If this set is a set of nodes taken
uniformly at random in the core Internet (i.e. all the nodes
have the same probability to be chosen) then the obtained
degree distribution is itself an approximation of the degree
distribution of the core Internet, and the larger the sample,
the better the approximation. However, choosing uniformly at
random a node in the core Internet is not possible in general.
We explain here how to bypass this issue.
First notice that it is easy to sample a random IP address,
as this is noting but a 32 bit integer. But a random IP address
is not a random node, as routers may have several interfaces
(aka IP addresses) and then the probability to sample a router
by sampling a random address is proportional to its number
of interfaces. As a consequence, if we know the degree
distribution (pk) of nodes corresponding to IP addresses
sampled uniformly at random, then the degree distribution of
the set of all nodes is nothing but (pk/k).
In summary, although we are unable to sample uniformly
at random nodes in the core Internet, we are able to sample
uniformly at random IP addresses and infer from the degree
distribution of the corresponding nodes the one of the whole
core Internet.
In addition, the random IP addresses we sample may
belong to routers outside the core, to end-hosts, or even to
routers in the core behaving incorrectly (they do not answer to
probes or always use the same interface to answer). We easily
identify IP addresses which do not belong to core routers: we
see only one interface for them during our measurements, and
simply discard them (as a consequence, we obtain no estimate
of p1, the fraction of nodes of degree 1). Notice that core
routers which behave incorrectly also lead to nodes observed
with degree 1, or even 0, and discarding them is correct.
This induces no bias on the observed degree distribution if
their behavior is not correlated to their degree, which seems
a reasonable assumption.
Fig. 1. UDP PING: IP Packet structure
Finally, we obtain a practical method to sample a set
of uniformly random IP addresses of core routers, and to
infer from their degree distribution the one of the whole core
Internet. The quality of this estimate obviously depends on
the quality of our set of monitors and on the size of our set
of IP addresses. In-depth study of the achieved quality is a
challenging task which belongs to future work, but we will
discuss below ways to do so.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE TOOL
The implementation of the approach presented above led
to the design of UDP PING, available at http://www.rotenberg.
io/udpping/. We present below details of the implematation
and how to use it to deploy a coordinated and distributed
measurement campaing.
A. UDP PING
UDP PING is a measurement tool developed to discover
interfaces of machines in the Internet. It is run on a machine
M called the monitor. It takes the following parameters:
• Source interface (IS). An 4-byte integer corresponding
to an interface (IP address) of M on which UDP PING
is executed. When M is an end-host, it often has only
one interface, called the IP address of M.
• Target interface (IT ). A 4-byte integer corresponding
to an IP address.
• UDP Destination Port (P). A 2-byte integer in the
49152 - 65535 range. UDP Ports in this range are
assumed to be usually unallocated.
The goal of UDP PING is to detect if there is an active host
T (the target) that owns the address IT and, if such T exists, to
obtain an interface IT ′ of T that is used by T to send packets
towards IS (belonging to M). To do so, UDP PING forges an
IP packet (see Fig. 1), carrying an UDP packet (see Fig. 2).
The destination address of the IP packet is IT . The destination
port of the UDP packet is P. IT is split in two 2-byte parts.
The first 2-byte part is stored in the ID row of the IP packet
header. The second 2-byte part is stored in the UDP Source
Port row of the UDP message. By doing so, all the 4 bytes
of IT are stored in the packet/message headers. The data field
of the UDP packet contains a signature (typically a contact
e-mail address) to allow network administrators to contact the
sender upon receiving the message.
The IP/UDP packet is then sent by UDP PING through IS .
Once the packet is sent, UDP PING listens to all incoming
Fig. 2. UDP PING: UDP Packet structure
ICMP messages. If IT corresponds to an active host T, then
after receiving the packet, it detects that P is unreachable. T
generates a type 3 ICMP message (Destination Unreachable),
with error code 3 (Port Unreachable). This ICMP message
also contains the headers of the incriminating packet, and in
particular, the original IP ID row and UDP Source Port row. T
then chooses one of its interfaces, IT ′ , according to its routing
policy, to send the ICMP message back to its sender, IS . Note
that if T has more than one interface, IT ′ can be different
from IT . Eventually, UDP PING catches this ICMP message.
It extracts the following information:
• ICMP attached information, including the original IP
ID row and UDP Source Port row. This allows UDP
PING to reconstruct the 4-byte integer corresponding
to IT , and to identify this ICMP message as the
expected one.
• Source address of the ICMP message - that is IT ′ .
UDP PING then exits with a success code and returns IT ′ .
After a set amount of time, if UDP PING has not caught any
ICMP message properly identified as the expected one (using
the 4-byte integer reconstruction), it exits with a failure code.
This can happen for multiple reasons, the most common being:
• IT does not belong to any connected machine (target
offline)
• IT does belong to an existing, active machine T, but
T discards UDP errors without sending ICMP error
messages back
• IT correspond to an active machine T that generates
an ICMP error message but this message is filtered on
its way back to M (usually near T).
• IT is located beyond a firewall that silently discards
unsolicited UDP traffic.
• P is used by T, making it effectively reachable (and
then no error is generated at the network level).
B. Deploying UDP PING
Since IT ′ can vary depending on IS (and therefore depend-
ing on M), UDP PING may be used from multiple monitors
to get a list of distinct interfaces belonging to the same
target. Using UDP PING from a set of monitors towards the
same target IT is called Distributed UDP PING. If the set of
monitors is large enough and well distributed in the Internet,
one may then obtain several (and even all) interfaces of the
target.
Note that UDP PING requires privileges not only to execute
binary code on the monitor, but also to forge and send packets
at a very low level, and to listen and decode all the incoming
ICMP messages. On most UNIX system, UDP PING therefore
requires root privileges, which can be restrictive. However, if
one disposes of a set of monitors and is granted such privileges,
UDP PING can be effectively distributed using shell scripts and
ssh tools to launch remote execution of the tool an retrieve the
answers.
Since receiving a large amount of UDP messages from
distributed machines can look like a distributed attack by
the target host, or even unintentionally disable it, extreme
care must be taken not to send all the UDP messages at
once. A delay can (and should) be set between the sending
of successive UDP PING probes from the different monitors.
Likewise, all monitors should use the same target port, or else
the measurement may look like a UDP port scanning. Once all
these precautions are taken, the tool has no specific parameters
to tune and is rather simple to use.
V. CONCLUSION
In the work, we presented the details of the implementation
of a new method able to accurately estimate the degree
distribution of routers in the core Internet. We showed the
principle on which it relied, how it can be used to measure
the degree of a single router and how it can be deployed for a
coordinated distributed measurement campaign, leading to an
estimationg of the degree distribution of such routers.
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